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ON JUSTIFYING DEMOCRACY. By William N. Nelson. Boston:
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1980. Pp. ix, 176. $16.95.

Political philosophers have long searched for a rational basis for
belief in democracy. Traditionally, they have defended democracy
on procedural grounds such as the fundamental procedural equity .of
the system, the need for popular participation in government, and
the need for popular sovereignty. 1 William Nelson's On Just!fying
.Democracy attacks these traditional justifications and proposes its
own basis for belief in democracy. According to Nelson, democracy
is presumptively the best form of government because it is most
likely to produce morally correct decisions. While Nelson's approach is innovative because of its substantive rather than proceI. See, e.g., K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963) (popular
sovereignty justifies democracy); J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
(1962) (an economic justification of democracy); C. COHEN, DEMOCRACY (1971) (suggesting
that everyone affected by a decision should participate in the decision-making process); A.
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) (economic justification); R. NoZic~.
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) (suggesting that government exists to provide people
with that to which they are "entitled"); J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3rd ed. 1950) (participation, in itself, is a desirable goal); P. SINGER, DEMOCRACY
AND DISOBEDIENCE (1973) (defending procedural fairness as a)ustification for democracy).
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dural underpinnings, his argument for democracy 1s ultimately
unconvincing.
Nelson devotes a good deal of space to attacking each of the
traditional justifications of democracy. These first five chapters,
however, are not the focal point of the book and rely heavily on the
works of earlier philosophers.2 The core of Nelson's argument is
that an individual has no obligation to obey a morally unjustified
law.3 The procedural fairness of a system is thus irrelevant if that
system routinely enacts unjust legislation (p. 30).
After establishing this premise, Nelson next develops his argument that democracy, by its very nature, will produce morally defensible rules. An account of what constitutes "moral" rules is
obviously central to Nelson's thesis. For the utilitarian, moral rules
maximize aggregate or average happiness. John Rawls defines moral
rules as those that individuals will adopt under a condition of ideal
ignorance. In contrast, Nelson defines moral rules functionally,
maintaining that they must possess three properties:
(1) Compliance with the principles tends to produce benefits or prevent
harm; (2) The properties could serve as the shared, public principles
constituting a stable, 'fundamental charter of a well-ordered human
association' as Rawls understands this notion; and (3) The principles
could perform this function in a society of free and independent persons. [Pp. 109-10.]

Although the first condition resembles the utilitarian view that a
moral rule best maximizes happiness, it is in fact much weaker. Nelson means simply that the rules must be intended to promote benefits or prevent harms, not that they actually have this aggregate
effect.4 The second factor - that the rules are capable of generating
and perpetuating consensus-lies at the heart of Nelson's definition
of moral rules. 5 Nelson thinks that the requirement that the rules
represent a consensus that would endure over time "will tend to rule
out some seemingly unfair sets of principles," such as those espoused
by the racist (p. 106). The third condition - that free and independent persons generally accept the rules - is designed to exclude from
Nelson's definition of morality the situation where "slaves are so dehumanized that they would accept the slaveholders' rationale for
their common institutions" (p. 106). On Justtfying .Democracy argues
2. The uninitiated would probably benefit more from the original justifications than from
Nelson's truncated synopses.
3. One must note the distinction between a justifiable institutional form and a justifiable
law. Although a specific law enacted by a democracy may not be morally justified, a citizen
will tend to obey the commands of an institution - democracy- that is morally justified. P.
107.
4. Thus, Nelson nowhere discusses whether democratically adopted rules, individually or
on the whole, maximize happiness. Pp. 102-03, 109.
5. Nelson acknowledges that almost all of his discussion of what constitutes a well-ordered
society is borrowed from Rawls. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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that democracy will tend to generate rules that meet these three criteria because "public functionaries will attempt to develop cogent jus~
tifi.cations for their policies; and these justifications will have to be
capable of gaining widespread acceptance" (p. 116).
Nelson's justification of democracy is inadequate in several fundamental respects. 6 First, many will find his assessment of the political process in modem democracies highly unrealistic. Political
campaigns often seem more notable for their advertising techniques
than for the coherence or depth of their policy justifications. Second,
Nelson's defense of democracy is almost tautological. Democracy,
by definition, requires that widespread support exist for enacted
rules. Suspiciously, Nelson has defined moral rules as those that
could produce a consensus. Of course, there may be differences between rules that command (roughly) majority support and those that
can maintain a stable consensus. On Just!fying .Democracy, however,
does not develop the notion of "consensus" and says little about the
substantive features that a "stable" rule must possess. Because Nelson has not adequately discussed how moral rules can be distinguished from democratically adopted rules, his argument claims,
justifi.es, and illuminates very little.
Most readers are also likely to find Nelson's definition of morality unsatisfying. At one point, he posits that a rule "can be objectively just or unjust" (p. 5). Yet by the end of the book, he is arguing
that "a set of principles is an adequate morality only when it represents a possible consensus among free and independent people" (p.
106). What was originally an objective definition of morality becomes what many will regard as subjective. If an unbiased consensus holds something to be just, it becomes, under Nelson's definition,
objectively just. Thus, where a group of free and independent individuals constituting ninety-nine percent of a society adopts a rule
that represses the remainder of the society, Nelson might be committed to describing that rule as moral. Many will be distressed by such
a description.
There are other disturbing aspects to Nelson's argument. For instance, he often seems to impose different standards on his own theory than he does on those of others. When discussing the
"participation" justification for democracy. he notes that "[i]t is not
true that everyone wants to play an active role in political decisionmaking" (p. 47). Yet when he presents his own theory, Nelson insists
that "[m]ost people are concerned about the opinions of others" (p.
108). Although both statements are possibly true, it is not immediately clear that the first suggestion ought to be rejected out-of-hand,
6. In addition to the argumentative deficiencies, there are also occasional stylistic difficulties. See, e.g., p. 105 (A system "is an adequate system if it satisfies the conditions of adequacy
for systems of its type.").
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while the second ought to be accepted without support. Such varying standards for different theories give Nelson's position the veneer
of unassailability, but they detract from the persuasiveness of his
effort.
Perhaps this assessment of Nelson's work is too harsh. Nelson
necessarily covers a large amount of philosophical ground in a short
space. He has, at the very least, presented an interesting viewpoint
from which to evaluate political systems. Such a presentation is, in
itself, no small accomplishment. What Nelson does not achieve,
however, is a satisfactory demonstration of the superiority of political democracy. Due to its ambiguous and questionable definition of
morality, On Justifying .Democracy fails to persuade one that democracy produces truly moral rules. It succeeds only in suggesting a new
basis on which political democracy may someday be justified. It is
left to a later author to provide a compelling justification of this sort.

